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Nelson Lund2 
In 1992, the people of Arkansas voted to require that their 
U.S. Representatives and Senators run as write-in candidates if 
they wished to serve more than three terms or two terms, 
respectively. This new provision of the Arkansas Constitution was 
challenged under the U.S. Constitution’s Qualifications Clauses. 
The first of these clauses provides that no one may serve as a 
Representative “who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty 
five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, 
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for 
which he shall be chosen.”3 The provision for Senators is identical 
except that the age requirement is thirty years, and the citizenship 
requirement is nine years.4 
The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the people’s choice by 
a five-four vote.5 The authors of the majority and dissenting 
opinions, Justices John Paul Stevens and Clarence Thomas 
respectively, engaged in an exceptionally elaborate debate. Both 
opinions seemed to recognize, at least implicitly, that a clear and 
definitive resolution of the case could not be derived directly from 
the language of the Qualifications Clauses, or from their 
 
 1. Louis and Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy, Northwestern 
University Pritzker School of Law. 
 2. University Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. For 
helpful comments, I am grateful to Stephen G. Gilles. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. 
 5. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
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legislative history, or from the Court’s own precedents. For 
Justice Stevens, the deciding consideration was a political theory: 
[T]he text and structure of the Constitution, the relevant 
historical materials, and, most importantly, the “basic 
principles of our democratic system” all demonstrate that the 
Qualifications Clauses were intended to preclude the States 
from exercising any [control over congressional qualifications] 
and to fix as exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution.6 
The “basic principles” to which Stevens refers here are taken 
from a quotation, to which he recurs over and over again, that has 
been attributed to Alexander Hamilton at the New York ratifying 
convention: “the people should choose whom they please to 
govern them.”7 
Justice Thomas raised two major objections to this use of 
democratic theory. First, the people of Arkansas in fact did 
choose whom they pleased to govern them, namely individuals 
elected from among those who met the qualifications set out in 
the Arkansas Constitution.8 Second, there is no “basic principle” 
of our democratic system that requires the people to express their 
choices only in elections and never in their constitutions, and we 
have unchallengeable proof that no such principle exists. The 
provisions of the Constitution that Stevens thinks the people of 
Arkansas violated are themselves in violation of the very same rule 
that Stevens claims is a fundamental principle of our democratic 
system.9 Those Clauses forbid the people to choose to be 
governed by a twenty-four-year-old, or by a recently naturalized 
citizen, or by someone who does not inhabit the state, even if 
that’s who pleases them. 
Rather than respond to Stevens with an alternative theory of 
democracy, Thomas relies on a legal principle that he thinks is 
implied by the Constitution’s enumeration of powers.10 This 
principle is that the federal government has only the powers 
granted by the Constitution and that the States have all the 
 
 6. Id. at 806 (emphasis added). 
 7. Stevens repeats this quotation, or parts of it, at least six times. 514 U.S. at 783, 
793, 795 (twice), 796 n.12 (without quotation marks), 819. 
 8. Id. at 878–79 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. 
 10. For a critique of the Stevens opinion that focuses on democratic theory rather 
than on the law, see Nelson Lund, Rousseau and Direct Democracy (with a Note on the 
Supreme Court’s Term Limits Decision), 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 459, 501–09 
(2004). 
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powers that the Constitution has not taken from them, expressly 
or by clear implication.11 The Qualifications Clauses 
unambiguously establish minimum standards, and the 
Constitution gives Congress no power to supplement those 
qualifications with additional criteria. The States, however, are 
not forbidden to add new qualifications, and the Arkansas 
constitutional provision therefore does not violate the Clauses. 
If you are attracted by Justice Stevens’s opinion, you may like 
the approach taken in Martin Redish’s book about judicial 
independence. Like Stevens, Redish resolves important questions 
on the basis of a political theory that he believes is implicit in the 
U.S. Constitution. If you are more impressed with Justice 
Thomas’s arguments, as I am, you will be skeptical about many of 
the claims Redish makes. In this review, I will briefly summarize 
the principal arguments in the book, and explain why I think its 
major conclusions are mistaken. 
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 
It is neither novel nor controversial to say, as this book does, 
that an important feature of our political system is the 
independence that the Constitution gives to the federal judiciary. 
The exact nature and extent of that independence, however, is in 
some respects debatable, and Redish makes some innovative 
arguments about the judiciary’s proper role. 
Notwithstanding his novel suggestions, Redish regards 
himself as a kind of constitutional conservative. Until recently, he 
believes, it was widely and properly assumed that the Constitution 
is a written document that was adopted in order “to enshrine a 
constitutional democracy that would effectively balance our 
competing interests in celebrating majority interests with the need 
to protect minority rights” (p. 15). The underlying assumption 
that the Constitution is that document and nothing else has, 
unfortunately, been disturbed by academic commentators whom 
he calls “modernists”: constitutional realists, popular 
constitutionalists, and departmentalists.12 Redish sets out to 
refute these theorists in a way that will reestablish what he calls 
 
 11. 514 U.S. at 847-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 12. Redish takes the term “modernist” from a school of architectural design that he 
dislikes. 
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“traditionalism” or the “formalist traditional model” on a new 
basis that he calls “premodern theory.” He then uses his new/old 
theory to discover implications in the Constitution that have gone 
unrecognized until now. 
It is true that the contemporary legal academy has produced 
a cacophony of competing theories unlike anything that existed in 
the past. What does not seem true is Redish’s picture of a settled 
traditionalism that was largely unchallenged until the arrival of 
academic wildlings like Bruce Ackerman, Larry Kramer, and 
Michael Stokes Paulsen.13 The real break with the past, it seems 
to me, came with the doctrinal adventurism of the Warren and 
Burger Courts, which is captured in the notion of the “living 
Constitution.” That development prompted attempts at reviving 
and refining the traditional theory of originalism, which in turn 
provoked a storm of “noninterpretivist” counter-theorizing in 
defense of the living Constitution.14 
By “constitutional realists,” Redish means academics who 
“challenge the premise that the complete American constitutional 
regime is set forth in the singular written document we identify as 
the Constitution” (p. 16). These writers argue that our supreme 
law is only what is actually treated as such, which is both more and 
less than what we find in the written document. Karl Llewellyn 
and other legal realists of the early twentieth century fall into this 
group, but Redish reserves most of his fire for some of our 
contemporaries: Ackerman, Todd Pettys, and Ernest Young. In 
his view, their scholarship “amounts to self and public deception” 
because they “challenge the fundamental import of the 
Constitution’s writtenness” (p. 31). 
I agree with Redish that the Constitution is the written 
document, and I do not believe any vague and changeable set of 
principles has taken its place as a legal matter. Such principles, 
however, undoubtedly do have effects that are sometimes almost 
equivalent to constitutional amendments, and I would stress 
something that Redish never acknowledges: these virtual 
 
 13. Redish is pretty tough on some of these theorists. What constitutional realists do, 
for example, “is downright deceptive,” and Professors Ackerman and Ernest Young could 
use some lessons from “a recent graduate of an eighth grade civics course” (pp. 32, 36). 
 14. The term “noninterpretivism” has gone out of fashion, perhaps because 
opponents of originalism have decided it is more politic to claim that they, too, are just 
interpreting the Constitution, not making it up to serve their political agendas. For an 
elaboration of this point, see Nelson Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery Tour, 
3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 31 (2015). 
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amendments are almost always caused or ratified by the Supreme 
Court’s misinterpretations of the Constitution. 
Whereas the realists generally purport to be descriptive, 
Redish says that “popular constitutionalists” such as Kramer 
advance a normative case for taking final authority to interpret 
the Constitution away from the courts and reposing it in the 
people themselves. Redish rejects this proposal on the grounds 
that its real effect would be to give dangerously unchecked power 
to “majority impulses,” and that it is inconsistent with the 
manifestly countermajoritarian nature of the Constitution (pp. 47-
48).15 
“Departmentalists,” exemplified for Redish by Paulsen, 
argue that each branch of the federal government has 
independent authority to interpret the Constitution.16 Unless such 
thinkers as James Madison, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham 
Lincoln can be considered “modernists,” perhaps it is advocates 
of departmentalism who should be considered traditionalists.17 In 
 
 15. Although Kramer does think that popular constitutionalism is normatively 
desirable, he also advances a detailed historical case, which Redish ignores, for treating it 
as a once-dominant American tradition going back to the founding era. Whether Kramer’s 
evidence and arguments are ultimately persuasive or not, he does not deserve to be 
dismissed with the flip comment that “[t]he very notion of a countermajoritarian 
Constitution refutes Kramer’s normative claim” (p. 47). One might just as easily dismiss 
Redish by saying that “the very notion of the sovereignty of the people refutes his claims 
about judicial supremacy.” (Tellingly, perhaps, Redish cites only a relatively short 
symposium piece by Kramer, and never mentions the substantial book he published in 
2004.) 
 16. Redish characterizes Paulsen as “[d]epartmentalism’s most vocal and extreme 
proponent” (p. 38). I agree that some of Paulsen’s views are atypical, and it is therefore 
unfortunate that Redish chose to focus entirely on one of his articles. A few of the endnotes 
make glancing allusions to other theorists, but there is no attempt to grapple seriously with 
their arguments. 
 17. See, e.g., Federalist No. 49 (“The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate 
by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an 
exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers . . . 
.”); James Madison, Veto Message on the National Bank (Jan. 30, 1815) (treating his own 
objections to the constitutionality of the bank as “precluded in my judgment by repeated 
recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in acts of the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by 
indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation”); 
Andrew Jackson, Bank Veto (July 10, 1832) (“It is maintained by the advocates of the 
bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled by 
precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent. 
Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding 
questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of the people and the 
States can be considered as well settled. . . . If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered 
the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this 
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any event, Redish’s attack on this view culminates in the claim 
that “judicial review requires judicial supremacy” (p. 41). His 
main argument is that if the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution were not treated as the supreme law, the legislature 
and executive would be able to undermine, or even completely 
destroy, the countermajoritarianism that is a fundamental feature 
of our political system (p. 41). 
The simplest rebuttal is that judicial supremacy would enable 
the courts to undermine, or even completely destroy, the popular 
nature of our government. Redish does not think much of this 
rebuttal. He believes that supreme authority over the 
interpretation of the Constitution has to be lodged somewhere, 
and that courts are rightly regarded as the least dangerous branch 
(pp. 43-44). But even granting the obvious truth that courts are in 
some respects less dangerous than elected officials, Redish is 
wrong to think that judicial review requires judicial supremacy. 
Let’s begin with Marbury v. Madison,18 which endorsed and 
defended judicial review. The most logically powerful argument 
in the Court’s opinion is this: faced with a conflict between the 
Constitution and a statute, courts have no choice except to give 
effect to the more authoritative of the two laws, namely the 
Constitution.19 That logic applies to the President every bit as 
much as it does to the Supreme Court, even if the President’s 
interpretation of the Constitution differs from the Court’s. 
Significantly, nobody on the Supreme Court has ever 
accepted all the implications of Marbury’s logic. Any Justice who 
did so would have to conclude that conflicts between the 
 
Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided 
by its own opinion of the Constitution.”); Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 
4, 1861) (“[I]f the policy of the government, upon vital questions affecting the whole 
people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are 
made, in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have 
ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government 
into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”). 
 18. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 19. Id. at 176–78. Chief Justice Marshall does not say that the writtenness of the 
Constitution logically implies judicial authority to invalidate any law that a court believes 
is unconstitutional. He does maintain that it “would subvert the very foundation of all 
written constitutions” to declare that “if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, 
such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual.” Id. at 178 
(emphasis added). Marbury advances other arguments for judicial review, but they are not 
arguments based on the logic of all written constitutions. It would be perfectly logical, if 
perhaps inadvisable, for a written constitution to place final authority for interpreting the 
document in a legislature or some other non-judicial institution. 
4 - LUND.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/18  11:59 AM 
2018] BOOK REVIEWS 51 
 
Constitution and judicial precedent must always be resolved by 
giving effect to the Constitution, not the precedent. After all, if 
statutes enacted by the people’s representatives are always 
trumped by the Constitution, it would seem to follow that mere 
judicial opinions must also be trumped by the Constitution. 
According to the Constitution itself, the “supreme Law of the 
Land” includes the Constitution, statutes enacted pursuant to the 
Constitution, and treaties. Conspicuously absent from this list is 
any mention of judicial opinions. 
Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Marshall nowhere claimed 
that the Court is or should be supreme in the interpretation of the 
Constitution. Such an assertion did not appear until Cooper v. 
Aaron in 1958.20 In practice, the Supreme Court has developed a 
complex and flexible approach to the exercise of judicial review. 
There is almost nobody who would seriously maintain today that 
courts are obliged by the Constitution to enforce unconstitutional 
statutes. But it is also true that very few would seriously maintain 
that courts are always obliged to strike down statutes they think 
are unconstitutional, even in the face of thoroughly settled judicial 
precedent. 
Presidents take the same general approach that the Supreme 
Court has taken. In principle, Presidents always have the option 
of refusing to enforce or comply with statutes they consider 
unconstitutional, whether or not the Supreme Court agrees with 
them. But they are not obliged to ignore or defy every such 
statute. Similarly, the Constitution nowhere imposes on the 
legislature an obligation to relentlessly impose its own 
constitutional views by impeaching every executive and judicial 
officer who acts in a manner that Members of Congress consider 
unconstitutional. 
One might think, with Redish, that leaving the President, the 
Supreme Court, and the Congress with concurrent authority to 
decide on the meaning of the Constitution is an invitation to 
constitutional crises and ultimately to chaos or tyranny.21 History 
demonstrates that this is not so. The simple fact is that each 
 
 20. 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958).  In context, even that statement could be interpreted to 
mean only that state courts are required to treat the holdings in Supreme Court decisions 
as the supreme law of the land.  
 21. Redish puts the thought this way: “[W]ithout judicial supremacy, coordinacy 
would be impossible” (p. 40). 
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branch of government sometimes gets the last word and 
sometimes does not. 
The Supreme Court, for example, has lots of devices by which 
it avoids trying to become the last word on all constitutional 
questions. These include doctrines under which the Justices 
sometimes decline to exercise judicial review, as well as countless 
rulings that leave the other branches with broad discretion to 
interpret their own constitutional powers.22 
Like the courts, Presidents have sought to minimize conflicts 
with the other branches. Over the years, for example, the 
President’s legal advisors in the Justice Department have 
developed an elaborate internal jurisprudence that largely 
adheres to Supreme Court precedents. That jurisprudence 
displays some independence from the views of the judiciary, 
especially with respect to matters directly touching on the 
President’s institutional interests, such as the scope of executive 
authority. But the jurisprudence is memorialized in written legal 
opinions that take judicial decisions very seriously and treat them 
as dispositive on many issues.23 
Presidents, moreover, have not felt compelled to exercise 
every right they believe they have or that the Justice Department 
tells them they have. There is a fundamentally important 
distinction between claiming the authority to do something and 
actually doing it.24 History shows that the people who have 
occupied seats of power in all three branches have managed to 
avoid the kind of war that might actually establish one branch as 
the supreme and definitive interpreter of the Constitution. 
II. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY UNBOUND 
A. IMPEACHMENT 
If such a war were ever conducted, the Constitution’s text 
seems to indicate pretty clearly who should win. Congress has the 
 
 22. Well known examples include the political-question doctrine and the 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 
(1819). 
 23. These Justice Department legal opinions are purely advisory so far as the 
President is concerned. The President is free to ignore or overrule them, and Presidents 
sometimes do just that. 
 24. For a case study, see Nelson Lund, Presidential Signing Statements in Perspective, 
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 95 (2007) 
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authority to remove any officer, executive or judicial, for 
“Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”25 
Why would one doubt that acting unconstitutionally could 
properly be considered a high crime or misdemeanor? Or that 
Congress has the authority to remove an officer who behaves in a 
way that a sufficient number of its members believe is 
unconstitutional? 
Redish denies that this authority exists, and his explanation 
reveals a lot about his theory of constitutionalism. He does not 
deny that a President might lawfully be removed merely for acting 
unconstitutionally. But he maintains that judges may be removed 
only for “criminal behavior that threatens the integrity of the 
judicial role,” and never for a decision reached in the course of 
adjudication (p. 80). He justifies this double standard (which has 
no basis in the Constitution’s text) on the ground that judicial 
independence is so important that the impeachment power may 
not be used in any way that could possibly threaten judicial 
supremacy over the interpretation of the Constitution. The 
Constitution’s supermajority requirement for conviction is not 
nearly enough to satisfy Redish’s demand for 
countermajoritarianism (p. 95).26 
It’s worth pausing at this point to consider some implications 
of Redish’s position. Suppose that five Justices voted to create a 
constitutional right for a mother to have her child put to death 
during the first week of its life in order to protect her physical or 
mental health. As a matter of doctrine, this hypothetical is a very 
short step beyond the Court’s current position on late-term 
abortions,27 so it is not far-fetched in that respect. If the House of 
Representatives impeached these Justices, Redish would have the 
Supreme Court declare the indictment unconstitutional.28 It’s 
unlikely, of course, that the Court would create a right to 
infanticide until after some significant political demand for such a 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 26. Redish describes the supermajoritarian impeachment process as “a majoritarian 
check” (p. 100). Going even farther, he sometimes rejects the right of “society” to remove 
judges from office for non-criminal misbehavior (pp. 78, 102). This seems to challenge what 
I always thought was the truly fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the people. 
 27. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007). 
 28. See p. 80 (political-question doctrine should be inapplicable to congressional 
impeachment decisions). 
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right arose.29 But that suggests that Redish’s absolute rule against 
impeachment for adjudicatory decisions is not needed. Ironically, 
moreover, one reason that the Justices never issue decisions that 
lead to their impeachment is probably that even they recognize 
the flaws in Redish’s theory of absolute judicial immunity.30 
If Redish has correctly interpreted the Constitution, of 
course, it should be irrelevant whether the absolute immunity he 
advocates is either necessary or salutary. How, then, does he go 
about the task of interpretation? Redish insists on the importance 
of the Constitution’s writtenness in his critiques of realists and 
popular constitutionalists, and he expressly characterizes himself 
as a “textualist” (e.g., p. 83). He also believes that the judiciary 
lacks moral or legal authority to overturn legitimate political 
choices by elected officials (pp. 3, 41). One therefore might expect 
him to adopt the interpretive theory of originalism. This he 
emphatically does not do. On the contrary, he says, “rigid 
originalism should play no role in modern constitutional 
interpretation,” apparently because it requires “archaeological 
excavation” that is unnecessary and sometimes misleading (pp. 
10, 18 & nn.19, 92 (emphasis added)).31 
 
 29. Redish could hardly object that this hypothetical is unrealistic. He maintains both 
that his narrow definition of impeachable offenses is consistent with congressional practice 
(p. 101) and that “one must shape constitutional interpretation to deal with problems that 
theoretically may arise” (p. 228 n.94). Note, as well, that Redish has a very narrow view of 
what kinds of non-adjudicatory behavior can justify impeachment: “criminal behavior that 
threatens the integrity of the judicial role” (p. 80). Suppose that a Supreme Court Justice 
had a late-term abortion that inadvertently resulted in a live birth. If she immediately 
injected the baby with a lethal drug that she obtained from her physician, she could not be 
impeached without proof that the homicide threatened the integrity of the judicial role. 
That might be very hard to do, especially if the state prosecutor declined to indict her. If 
she were impeached without such proof, Redish’s theory would require the Supreme Court 
to declare the indictment unconstitutional, no matter how heinous the Justice’s behavior 
seemed to most of the nation. 
 30. Cf., e.g., (Walter) Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993) (“Judicial 
involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review, is 
counterintuitive because it would eviscerate the ‘important constitutional check’ placed on 
the Judiciary by the Framers . . . [by] plac[ing] final reviewing authority with respect to 
impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment process is meant to 
regulate.” (citation to Federalist No. 81 omitted)). 
 31. I say “apparently” because Redish is quite cryptic about the reasons for his 
rejection of originalism. Buried in one endnote are references to “a usually fruitless effort 
to ascertain the narrow understanding of a group of drafters some 200 years ago” and to a 
“largely futile attempt to constrain words by some narrow and unchanging historical 
perspective” (p. 224 n.27). Whether these characterizations of originalism are accurate or 
not, they seem to suggest why he would regard originalism as a source of misleading 
archaeological excavations. It’s worth noting that Redish goes far beyond anything that 
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In order to flesh out Redish’s interpretive approach, let’s 
return to judicial review, which he thinks requires judicial 
supremacy. It is easy to make a strong case for judicial review on 
originalist grounds. Judicial review was practiced in Great Britain 
for hundreds of years, its legitimacy was widely accepted in the 
United States when the Constitution was adopted, and it was 
therefore an aspect of the “judicial Power” conferred on the 
Supreme Court by the Vesting Clause of Article III.32 Redish 
himself alludes briefly to such “archaeological” evidence before 
summarizing a “conceivable” argument based on the Due Process 
Clauses and a “question begging” argument based on the 
Supremacy Clause (pp. 24-25). Dissatisfied with all these 
arguments, he concludes: “In truth, the most logical explanation 
of judicial review is common sense, logic, and reverse engineering 
from the structural Constitutional itself” (p. 25). This explanation 
turns out to be very simple. The Constitution gives unelected 
judges salary and tenure protections in order to create a formal 
barrier against tyranny, and that barrier would be ineffective 
unless the judges have final and binding interpretive authority 
(e.g., pp. 26, 40).33 
His treatment of judicial review exemplifies Redish’s 
approach to constitutional interpretation. American 
constitutionalism consists, he believes, of a core principle that he 
calls “skeptical optimism,” along with the political apparatus that 
the structural Constitution uses to effectuate that principle (p. 
21).34 Skeptical optimism strikes me as a perfectly serviceable 
shorthand for the spirit of what we call the Enlightenment, and 
maybe even the spirit of the Christianity that dominated America 
during the founding era. It is a lot harder to see how this general 
outlook constitutes a principle that could help us discern the 
meaning of constitutional language that is vague or ambiguous. 
And if originalism seldom leads to unimpeachable answers, as 
 
Justice Stevens said or implied in the Term Limits case, where Stevens engaged in 
extensive archaeological excavation. 
 32. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Judicial Review and Judicial Duty: The Original 
Understanding, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 169, 173 (2009). 
 33. At one point, Redish says that judges “would only be removable on impeachment 
or for bad behavior” (p. 26). In light of his later rejection of claims that judges might be 
removed by some means other than impeachment (pp. 81–88), I take this to be an editing 
error. 
 34. As his terminology suggests, Redish thinks the founders optimistically believed 
that a strong majoritarian government was needed to empower the people, but worried at 
the same time about a tyranny of the majority (p. 21). 
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Redish maintains, filling one’s soul with the spirit or attitude of 
“skeptical optimism” will generate whatever answer one likes to 
just about every constitutional question. With respect to the 
proper scope of judicial independence, for example, should we be 
optimistic about judges and skeptical about voters and elected 
officials, or vice versa? Or, if one takes the sensible position that 
we should be skeptical and optimistic about both, what degrees 
and forms of skepticism and optimism are appropriate toward 
each? 
More promising is Redish’s suggestion that an appropriate 
guide for the interpreter can be found through reverse 
engineering the structural Constitution. He is right to identify 
several ways in which our Constitution is deliberately and 
manifestly different from Great Britain’s: it is written; it proclaims 
its supremacy as positive law; it is formally alterable only through 
a complex supermajoritarian process; and it creates a politically 
insulated judiciary that interprets the Constitution (pp. 22-23). 
This is a plausible basis from which to infer the legitimacy of 
judicial review. But it is not an adequate basis from which to infer 
judicial supremacy. 
In order to see why, it’s helpful to focus on a difference 
between the British and American constitutions whose 
importance is easy to overlook. Judicial review is often and 
mistakenly thought to be an American invention. British courts 
refused to implement unconstitutional acts of the Crown, which is 
one form of judicial review. Because Parliament served both as 
the legislature and as the highest court in the land, ordinary courts 
did not declare Acts of Parliament unconstitutional. It would have 
been as improper for a mere court to declare a statute 
unconstitutional as it would be for one of our inferior federal 
courts to overrule a decision of our Supreme Court. When 
American constitutions separated the highest judicial court from 
the legislature, they created a potential for interbranch conflicts 
between those who make statutory law and those who enforce 
constitutional law. As it turned out, no serious conflicts arose for 
a long time. Marbury’s exercise of judicial review was 
noncontroversial, and it was not until Dred Scott that the Court 
provoked political opposition by declaring a federal statute 
unconstitutional. 
Politically contentious exercises of judicial review obviously 
became much more common after the ensuing civil war, and they 
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are now routine. Strikingly, Redish never tries to show that even 
the most intense of these controversies has actually threatened 
the independence of the judiciary. And I don’t see how he could. 
We have developed an informal norm against political 
interference with judicial independence so strong that even 
Franklin Roosevelt could not overcome it. Though his plan to 
pack the Court was perfectly constitutional on its face, an 
overwhelmingly Democratic Congress refused even to consider 
it.35 This makes me wonder why Redish so aggressively argues that 
“[t]he prophylactically insulated judiciary is the beating heart of 
the structural brilliance that defines American constitutionalism” 
(p. 17). It would make more sense to say that the Constitution’s 
structural brilliance lies in the system that has produced a political 
and legal culture in which no one branch has obtained absolute 
sovereignty over the interpretation of the Constitution. The 
“reverse engineering” that Redish favors leads more easily to the 
departmentalism that he denounces than to the judicial 
supremacy that he advocates. 
Although Redish calls himself a textualist and a 
traditionalist, it would be more accurate to call him a living 
constitutionalist.36 He believes he has discovered in judicial 
supremacy the spirit or beating heart of the Constitution, and that 
a commitment to seeking the original meaning of the 
Constitution’s text could only impede the task of working out the 
implications of that discovery. Some of those implications turn out 
to be so remarkable that one is almost tempted to think that an 
idée fixe may be at work. 
B. LIFE TENURE 
The arguments Redish marshals in favor of judicial 
supremacy are extremely weak, but they do have a starting point 
in the Constitution’s salary and tenure protections for federal 
judges. Even if he goes too far in drawing inferences from the 
constitutional text, these judges were certainly meant to enjoy a 
very high degree of adjudicatory independence. As Redish 
repeatedly and rightly emphasizes, this countermajoritarian 
 
 35. Even Redish does not seem prepared to say that it was unconstitutional for a 
President to propose adding new seats to the Court. 
 36. Although he never uses this term to describe his approach to interpretation, he 
does at one point explicate his textualism in a way that sounds very much like living 
constitutionalism (pp. 97-99). 
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element in the structural Constitution was meant to help protect 
individuals from politically motivated invasions of their rights. 
All of our nation’s state constitutions establish an 
independent judiciary, but many of them make their judges more 
politically accountable than federal judges are. Redish thinks this 
is a really bad idea, and he focuses especially on retention 
procedures that allow the voters to decide at intervals whether a 
judge should remain on the bench. Although Redish barely seems 
to recognize it, the designers of all American constitutions faced 
a tradeoff in responding to two opposite dangers. Too much 
political insulation allows judges to get away with defying the law, 
up to and including the illegal adoption of virtual constitutional 
amendments. Too little political insulation incentivizes judges to 
shrink from faithfully enforcing laws to which large numbers of 
voters may strongly object. 
Redish may be right that the federal life-tenure arrangement 
is better than the retention systems adopted by many states. But 
he does not provide anything like the kind of empirical evidence 
that would be needed to make a strong case for his position. Nor 
does he try. Instead, he asserts that state retention systems violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not 
surprisingly, he makes no effort to conduct the kind of 
“archaeological excavation” that an originalist would think is 
necessary. Rather, he assumes that due process requires a neutral 
decisionmaker, argues that state judges subject to retention 
procedures are inherently less neutral than judges who enjoy life 
tenure, and concludes that such procedures are therefore 
unconstitutional (pp. 114-116). 
Redish recognizes that it is impossible to guarantee that 
judges will be perfectly unbiased. He notes, for example, that all 
judges have to be appointed by somebody, and that they will 
naturally feel gratitude toward those to whom they owe their 
appointment. In focusing as heavily as he does on the danger that 
a judge will be biased by the incentives created by retention 
systems, however, Redish pays no attention to the danger that a 
judge will be biased by his own political or ideological views. This 
is the hardest kind of bias to suppress, and English judges spent 
centuries cultivating an ideal of resistance to external and internal 
pressures to refrain from applying the positive law.37 Anyone who 
 
 37. For the history, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008). 
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thinks the dangers created by internal political and ideological 
biases are insignificant must be reading federal judicial opinions 
through some very rosy spectacles.38 
The starting point for Redish’s discussion of personal bias is 
a critique of Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,39 in which the 
Court found that due process was violated when a state judge sat 
on a case in which one of the litigants had made a large financial 
contribution to the judge’s election campaign. Redish argues that 
the risk of bias arising from retrospective gratitude, as in this case, 
is smaller than the risk created by retention systems that generate 
fear of future consequences for unpopular decisions. And because 
these retention systems exist “out of tradition, not necessity” (p. 
127), the Supreme Court should abolish them in the name of due 
process. 
If that argument is correct, it should follow that federal 
judges should also be relieved from such prospective pressures to 
the maximum possible extent. Any judge who hopes to be 
promoted to a higher court faces an implicit pressure to please the 
politicians who control such promotions. The effects are pretty 
easy to see in the opinions of some federal judges, and it is 
probably much harder to resist that pressure than for state judges 
to stick to the law in the face of adverse public sentiment.40 It 
would therefore seem that due process requires a rule that no 
sitting or former judge may be promoted to a higher court. This 
would obviously have some effects that might be undesirable, 
 
 38. Redish takes it to be self-evident that when faced with a choice between over- 
and under-protection of a constitutional right, over-protection must be chosen if at all 
possible (p. 127). But he does not seem even to recognize our constitutional right to be 
free from unconstitutional laws illegally imposed on us by judges. Consider two of the most 
prominent modern examples of judges who lost retention elections because of their judicial 
decisions. Rose Bird and two other members of the California Supreme Court lost their 
seats because they persistently frustrated the operation of the state’s capital punishment 
laws. Three members of the Iowa Supreme Court lost a retention election after they voted 
to create a right to same-sex marriage. In both cases, the unpopular decisions can also very 
plausibly be described as willful defiance of the law. Redish does not provide a single 
example of any judge having been removed from office for making lawful decisions that 
proved to be unpopular. 
 39. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 40. Although it is no doubt true that a relatively small proportion of federal judges 
are hoping for promotion in the near term, it is also true that the entire lifetime record of 
any candidate for promotion is likely to be scrutinized with some care, not only by judge 
pickers in the executive branch, but also by Senate staff and a variety of interest groups. 
State judges subject to retention elections will almost never be called on to faithfully apply 
the law in a case that is likely to become a matter of significant public controversy, let alone 
likely to drive a majority of the voters to remove the judge from office. 
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such as a total lack of trial court experience among appellate 
judges. But life tenure also has some unquestionably undesirable 
effects, such as allowing judges to get away with imposing their 
personal political and ideological agendas on their fellow citizens. 
While insisting that the logic of due process requires a radical 
revamping of the judicial systems in many states, Redish refuses 
to accept that the same logic requires a much more modest 
alteration of federal practice. In one of his endnotes, Redish 
concedes that federal judges could “conceivably” shape their 
decisions to curry favor with those empowered to promote them 
(p. 235 n.99). He then asserts that a rule against such promotions 
would be “for a variety of obvious reasons, an untenable result” 
(p. 235 n.99). He never tells us what those obvious reasons are, 
and it is not obvious to me why such a rule would be “untenable.” 
The functions performed by appellate judges, for example, are so 
different from that of trial judges that nobody seems to think that 
experience on a trial bench should be a prerequisite to serving on 
an appellate court. Similarly, we have had many Supreme Court 
Justices with little or no experience on a lower court, and it is 
hardly obvious that such experience is even helpful, let alone 
necessary, in performing the kind of work that the Court has 
decided it wants to perform. 
Here again, we can see why Redish is best characterized as a 
living constitutionalist. Although he calls himself a textualist and 
a traditionalist, his arguments for using the Supreme Court to 
impose judicial life tenure on the states are not based on the text 
of the Constitution, or on any tradition. Like so many other living 
constitutionalists, Redish fashions an argument that permits him 
to impute his own policy views to the Due Process Clauses. But 
does he really take the structural Constitution seriously? Or the 
importance of giving all adjudicators the independence of Article 
III judges? 
Apparently not. He dismisses concerns about federalism, 
which is every bit as much a part of the structural Constitution as 
judicial independence, on the ground that they are “question-
begging” (p. 112).41 Even more strikingly, this book is completely 
silent about the massive amount of adjudication by the federal 
 
 41. The relevant endnote (p. 230 n.9) offers a nonsensical “id.” citation to a 
concurrence by Justice Kennedy. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Caperton, and no 
opinion in the case includes the language quoted in the endnote. 
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government that takes place every day without anything close to 
the independence that state judges enjoy. The federal government 
deploys armies of executive branch officials to resolve cases in 
which the rights of American citizens are at stake. This aspect of 
the modern administrative state is, to put it mildly, highly 
questionable in light of the structural Constitution and the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.42 Can anyone really believe 
that federal bureaucrats are more neutral than state judges 
subject to retention elections? Redish’s proposed abolition of 
judicial retention procedures resembles an effort to reduce air 
pollution by banning cigarettes in Yellowstone Park, all the while 
ignoring the gigantic billows of black smoke from a forest fire 
caused by an open campfire. 
C.  LEGISLATIVE FRAUD 
The book’s neglect of the constitutional problems posed by 
executive-branch adjudication is particularly striking because the 
very next chapter asserts that the resolution of individual cases 
falls within the judicial power by definition; it therefore belongs 
to “the one branch vested with the ‘judicial power’” (p. 146). 
Rather than attend to the implications of this principle with 
respect to executive adjudication, Redish draws the following 
novel inference: “the judiciary has the constitutional power and 
obligation to assure that Congress not deceive the electorate as to 
the manner in which its legislation actually alters the preexisting 
legal, political, social, or economic topography” (p. 140). The 
putative deception with which Redish is concerned here occurs 
when a legislature enacts a procedural or evidentiary rule that 
affects the operation of a substantive statute in a way that 
transforms its “essence” (pp. 141, 158-162).43 
 
 42. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 
(2014). In a subsequent chapter, Redish assumes that hearings conducted by executive 
officials can be consistent with due process because the Supreme Court has said so (pp. 
191-92). He seems to think that this is permissible because review of constitutional 
questions raised in these cases is available in Article III courts (p. 192). But the Supreme 
Court is also available to review constitutional questions raised by decisions of state judges 
who are subject to retention procedures. Redish never explains why the availability of 
appellate review is sufficient in one case and not the other. His reliance on Supreme Court 
case law seems, to use his term, question-begging. 
 43. Redish uses the term “DNA” to describe what he calls a statute’s “essence.” I do 
not understand the metaphor, which may have some significance that has escaped me. 
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Redish finds this theory lurking in the Supreme Court’s 
notoriously confusing opinion in United States v. Klein.44 I will 
pass over his lengthy analysis of the case for three reasons. First, 
he does not claim that his theory is actually articulated in the Klein 
opinion, and he acknowledges that the Court may not have “fully 
grasped” the theoretical implications of what it did say (p. 142). 
Second, the Court has never interpreted Klein the way Redish 
does (p. 142). Third, it is apparent from his discussion that Redish 
would think that his conclusions are dictated by the Constitution 
and would therefore be valid even if Klein had never been 
decided. 
The essence of Redish’s reasoning is that basic democratic 
theory requires legislators to be accountable to the public for their 
votes. If they enact a substantive statute that says “A” and a 
procedural or evidentiary rule that causes the effect of the statute 
to be “B” or “not A,” the legislature has committed a “fraud on 
the public” in which the courts should refuse to become complicit 
(pp. 68, 154-156, 162-163).45 
Redish offers only one example of such unconstitutional 
behavior, which he finds in Michael H. v. Gerald D.46 The case 
involved a California statute that established a presumption, 
rebuttable only by the husband or wife, that a husband who is not 
sterile or impotent is the father of a child born to his wife while 
they were cohabiting. In this case, a blood test showed that a man 
 
 44. 80 U.S. 128 (1872). Klein declared unconstitutional a statutory provision whose 
substance the Court described as follows: “an acceptance of a pardon, without disclaimer, 
shall be conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, but shall be null and void as evidence of 
the rights conferred by it, both in the Court of Claims and in this court on appeal.” Id. at 
144. 
 45. When it comes to fraud, Redish has very sensitive antennae. Without judicial 
supremacy, he thinks, the Constitution would be “rendered worse than meaningless, for it 
would then amount to a sham designed to defraud the populace into believing that the 
majoritarian branches are checked when in reality the check would be illusory” (p. 62).  
 46. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Redish also discusses Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 
503 U.S. 429 (1992), in which the Court interpreted Klein to allow Congress to refer to 
specific pending cases in a statute that changes the law so long as it does not direct courts 
to reach specific results in those cases under the previous law. Redish acknowledges that 
it is “at least arguable” that Robertson was correctly decided, but says “it would probably 
be wise” for the Court to announce a prophylactic rule forbidding Congress to direct 
findings in specific cases (p. 158). 
  The chapter also includes a long paragraph that seems to set forth a hypothetical 
involving tort law (p. 155), but I just could not understand what the author is talking about. 
This chapter has many conspicuous errors, such as endnotes with no discernable 
connection to the accompanying text, some of which may reflect foul-ups during the editing 
or production processes. Maybe that’s what happened with the paragraph about tort law. 
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with whom a married woman had had an adulterous affair was 
probably the progenitor of a daughter born during her marriage 
to another man. The former paramour and the daughter (through 
a guardian ad litem) brought suit claiming that their due process 
rights were violated because the California courts denied 
visitation rights to the man who was probably the girl’s biological 
father. 
Unlike the Supreme Court, Redish believes the plaintiffs’ 
due process rights were violated. Why? He says that the provision 
of California’s Evidence Code that established the presumption 
of paternity “purports to have rights turn on the factual issue of 
who the natural father is” (p. 70 & n. 89). Shockingly, he quotes 
no language from this statute or anywhere else purporting to do 
any such thing.47 As far as I can tell, and I admit I’m only guessing, 
Redish thinks the evidentiary rule in the statute conflicts with the 
substantive public policy that motivated the statute (see p. 70). 
But he never tells us where or how California informed the public 
about this supposed policy. 
Why in the world would anyone think that a legislature 
defrauded the public by adopting a statute that means exactly 
what it says, and does not conflict on its face with any other law? 
As near as I can tell, Redish believes that what California did is 
like a consumer contract in which small-print boilerplate 
deceptively alters the terms in larger print (p. 159). “Society does 
not demand that all consumers possess the perspicacity of an 
experienced attorney” (p. 159). But if the rights that Redish thinks 
the Michael H. plaintiffs had been given by California were 
written in large print, they also seem to have been written with 
invisible ink. It would take a lawyer, not an ordinary consumer, to 
see a conflict between what a statute says and what the unstated 
public policy behind the statute is. And it takes a very bold lawyer 
to call a plainly worded statute a fraud on the public. 
Even apart from the mysteries surrounding Redish’s use of 
Michael H., could it possibly make any sense for courts to treat 
statutes as though they were consumer contracts? That would 
seem to mean that legislatures are defrauding the public when 
they use legal terminology that lay readers are unfamiliar with, or 
when they rely on courts to apply canons of construction that lay 
 
 47. The statute that establishes the presumption of paternity, which Redish never 
quotes, is set out in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117-18. 
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people do not know about. How many statutes will survive that 
test? 
Redish would undoubtedly resist this extension of his 
argument. He says that there will likely be few instances of the 
legislative deception that he thinks is unconstitutional (p. 162). He 
even says that there is some validity to the suggestion “that this 
chapter illustrates all too vividly what can happen to a Supreme 
Court decision [viz. Klein] when scholars get a hold of it” (p. 164). 
I’m afraid I have to add that this chapter illustrates what can 
happen when a scholar thinks up a solution to a problem that has 
not been shown to exist. 
Apart from the absence of any evidence that Congress or 
state legislatures actually defraud the public by enacting 
procedural rules that alter the operation of substantive statutes, 
this book has nothing to say about judicial behavior that really 
does look fraudulent. Everyone whose job entails the study of 
appellate opinions is familiar with sub silencio overrulings, 
patently ludicrous characterizations of prior precedent, ridiculous 
result-oriented distinctions between similar cases, and 
interpretations of constitutional and statutory texts that would 
never occur to a disinterested reader.48 
If one wanted to find a genuine case of fraud on the public, it 
might look a lot like National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius.49 In that case, Congress imposed a requirement that 
some citizens purchase a certain kind of health insurance. The 
requirement was enforced by what the statute called a “penalty,” 
and justified by a series of statutory findings confirming that it set 
forth a legal requirement in the exercise of congressional 
regulatory power.50 Characterizing this so-called individual 
mandate as a regulation, rather than a tax, was an important 
element in a strategy designed to protect those who voted for the 
Obamacare statute from political reprisals at the polls.51 
The Supreme Court held that the mandate exceeded the 
regulatory authority of Congress, from which it followed 
inexorably that an enforcement penalty was also invalid. 
 
 48. I assume that most readers of Constitutional Commentary will have their own 
favorite examples. 
 49. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 50. For citations, see id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 51. See, e.g., JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE 96–102 (2013). 
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Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion accepting 
the Obama administration’s argument that the penalty could be 
treated instead as an exercise of Congress’s taxation authority. 
This flew in the face of the plain language of the statute. It flew in 
the face of repeated statements by President Obama and the 
Obamacare bill’s supporters that the individual mandate was not 
a tax.52 And, as Chief Justice Roberts himself acknowledged, it 
was an interpretation of the statutory language that he adopted 
only because the regulatory requirement and accompanying 
penalty that Congress had purported to adopt were 
unconstitutional.53 If all of this was not a fraud on the public, it’s 
a lot closer to one than the Michael H. example. And the part of 
it that most closely resembles a fraud was the work of Chief 
Justice Roberts, not the Congress.54 
D. HABEAS CORPUS 
Another kind of fraud on the public was apparently 
committed by Congress, albeit unwittingly, when it proposed the 
Bill of Rights. According to Redish, the Fifth Amendment 
superseded the Suspension Clause of Article I.55 His legal 
argument has a very simple structure: the Due Process Clause is 
inconsistent with the Suspension Clause; the Fifth Amendment 
post-dates the original Constitution; ergo, the Due Process Clause 
repealed the Suspension Clause. 
Anyone familiar with the history of the founding era would 
probably wonder how this could be true. Redish does not pretend 
that James Madison or anyone else involved in drafting the Bill of 
Rights believed that they were repealing this or any other 
provision of the original Constitution. Nor does Redish suggest 
that anyone outside Congress had the slightest inkling of any 
inconsistency between the Fifth Amendment and the Suspension 
Clause. An originalist, moreover, could reconcile this historical 
background with the constitutional text by arguing that the 
 
 52. See id. 
 53. 567 U.S. at 561–63. 
 54. Cf. p. 152 (“Congress might undermine the sound operation of the representative 
democratic process by enlisting the judiciary as a co-conspirator in a plan to deceive the 
electorate”). 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2: (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.”). 
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essential elements of due process were already implied by the 
separation of powers in the original Constitution.56 
Redish, of course, claims to be a textualist, not an originalist. 
But where is the conflict between the texts of the two provisions? 
Whatever specific rights are protected by the Due Process Clause, 
none of which are set out in its text, the Suspension Clause on its 
face deals only with one particular remedy. The Suspension 
Clause does not purport to authorize any deprivations of 
whatever rights are entailed in due process, and the suspension of 
a particular remedial writ does not authorize the Executive to 
violate whatever due process rights a person may have. Redish 
never responds to this obvious objection to his position,57 not to 
mention other textualist objections that could be made, such as 
one based on the canon that repeals by implication are disfavored. 
Why is Redish sure that the Fifth Amendment has the 
“textually unambiguous and inescapable” effect of repealing the 
Suspension Clause (p. 167, emphasis added)?58 Tellingly, he does 
not begin with the text of the Constitution but with what the 
Supreme Court has said about due process (pp. 173-174). He then 
asserts that suspension allows the Executive to ignore what the 
Supreme Court has said. Ergo, the Fifth Amendment must be 
deemed to supersede the Suspension Clause (p. 174). However 
appealing the policy behind the conclusion may be, this is not a 
textual argument. 
Although Redish believes that this non-textual “textual 
interpretation” provides sufficient support for his position, he also 
 
 56. See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please!: The Original Insignificance of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 611 (2018). 
 57. The objection should be obvious to anyone familiar with the opinions in the 
Hamdi case, a decision to which Redish gives considerable attention in this chapter. See 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 594 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I do not see how 
suspension would make constitutional otherwise unconstitutional detentions ordered by 
the President. It simply removes a remedy.”). Oddly, the book has an endnote that refers 
to an academic article by Trevor Morrison, who maintains that suspension of the writ shifts 
responsibility for protection of due process rights to the Executive. Redish seeks to rebut 
Morrison by asserting that history shows that “the executive is all too happy to lock 
individuals up and throw away the key unless the courts step in and mandate individual 
hearings” (p. 250 n. 88). Whatever validity there is in this unsubstantiated assertion, and 
whatever relevance it may have to a living constitutionalist, it is emphatically not a textual 
argument. 
 58. See also p. 184 (“Because the due process guarantee is unlimited and unqualified 
in its reach, and appears in the form of a subsequently enacted amendment, it indisputably 
supersedes the inconsistent directive in the Suspension Clause purely as a matter of textual 
interpretation.” (emphasis added)). 
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advances what he thinks is an equally powerful argument based 
on the fundamental precepts of American constitutionalism (p. 
179). Simply put, the argument is that “the Framers were centrally 
concerned with the dangers of tyranny” and the Suspension 
Clause would allow a President to become a tyrant (p. 180).59 
Well, one wonders, why did the Framers put the Suspension 
Clause in the Constitution? The answer Redish gives is a 
classically living-constitution formulation: “[T]he core concepts of 
our political theory were a work in progress at the time of the 
framing. That the Framers were merely groping towards an 
understanding of the central premises of American 
constitutionalism is a concept that has evolved, been refined, and 
gained force over the years” (p. 181).60 
As we have come to expect by this point in the book, Redish 
goes on at great length about the terrible things that a President 
might do while the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. And, as we 
also expect, he exhibits no concern at all about the possibility that 
the courts might irresponsibly interfere with the public safety 
during a rebellion or invasion. Those responsible for framing a 
constitution would have good reason to worry about both 
dangers, and our Framers might reasonably have chosen to 
balance the competing desiderata differently than they did.61 I can 
understand why a living constitutionalist might want the Supreme 
Court to repeal the Suspension Clause. What I cannot understand 
is why the rest of us should go along with the pretense that this 
judicial amendment of the Constitution should be called an 
“unambiguous and inescapable” dictate of the Constitution’s text 
(p. 167). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The title of this book announces that it is about judicial 
independence and the Constitution. The author believes that 
 
 59. Redish says that it “is difficult to imagine a starker example of tyrannical 
government” than denying someone who has been arrested the benefits of the writ of 
habeas corpus (p. 204). Just to pick a couple of specimens that come immediately to mind, 
the regimes of Kim Jong Un and Pol Pot strike me as much starker examples. 
 60. See also p. 196 (arguing that the Framers did not devote “sufficient attention to 
the text or the meaning of the Due Process Clause” but that they were “moving towards” 
the conclusion that Redish has reached). 
 61. As Redish points out, there was a debate at Philadelphia about just this question, 
and some very respectable statesmen argued against including the Suspension Clause in 
the Constitution (pp. 171-173). 
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“modern doctrine has too often failed to recognize the full 
implications of American constitutionalism for the nature and 
extent of judicial independence” (pp. 204-205). I do not think he 
comes anywhere close to making his case. But I am also baffled 
about why he tries to do so. 
Judicial independence is an important part of our 
constitutional system. It is also among the least threatened aspects 
of that system. Redish never points to any serious attacks on the 
adjudicatory independence of the courts. When I tried to think of 
examples, the best I could come up with was Stuart v. Laird.62 This 
case involved a statute that (1) imposed circuit-riding duties on 
Justices who had been appointed before the statute took effect 
and (2) abolished some lower courts, thus depriving several 
Article III judges of their offices. The Court avoided ruling on the 
constitutionality of the second provision, and it upheld the circuit-
riding provision. The decision came after Congress abolished the 
Court’s 1802 term, and it may have resulted at least in part from 
fear of what the new Jeffersonian Congress might do next.63 
Whatever the motivations of the Justices, however, the one clear 
lasting effect was that their circuit riding obligations continued for 
another century. In itself, that was probably a good thing for the 
nation, and the case did not set a judicial precedent for allowing 
Congress to evade Article III’s tenure provision. 
Congress has very powerful tools that it could use to bend the 
federal courts to its will. The Constitution requires the Supreme 
Court to exist, but Congress can alter the number of Supreme 
Court Justices, as it has done repeatedly, and it can abolish 
inferior courts, as it has also done in the past. Congress could 
effectively emasculate the Supreme Court by depriving it of the 
assistance of the inferior courts, manipulating its jurisdiction, or 
altering the size of the Court in response to unpopular decisions. 
Except for diminishing the salary of sitting judges, Congress can 
do whatever it wants with judicial budgets. There are infinite ways 
in which this power could be used to make the judicial life a lot 
less pleasant than it is now.64 Congress could also bring back 
 
 62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 63. The Justices had previously discussed among themselves whether they should 
refuse on constitutional grounds to sit on circuit courts. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, 77–78 
n.102 (1985). 
 64. At one point, Redish seems to indicate that he regards such budgetary retaliation 
as constitutionally permissible (p. 57). Later, he seems to equivocate (p. 60). 
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circuit riding and mandatory jurisdiction, both of which were 
curtailed at the request of Justices who wanted to be free to decide 
only the cases they wanted to decide, thus magnifying their power 
to act as general superintendents of the nation.65 
Congress never uses any of these powers, let alone its power 
of impeachment, to punish judges for deciding cases differently 
than Congress wants them decided. And it is not as though judges 
are shy about making politically controversial decisions. The 
enormous increase in the power of the federal judiciary, which 
Congress has not just tolerated, but affirmatively facilitated, raises 
a number of interesting political science questions. One can also 
raise reasonable questions about whether this power has become 
a tool of an oligarchic elite that is effectively undermining 
democratic governance. But how can anyone seriously maintain 
that the federal courts have too little independence, or that their 
constitutionally appropriate independence is threatened in any 
way? 
Using the familiar tools of living constitutionalism, Redish 
articulates principles that he thinks are implied by the spirit of the 
Constitution, and he frequently invokes the philosopher’s stone 
that we call “due process.” He then draws startling inferences 
from the principles he has inferred. But why does he draw the 
particular inferences set forth in this book? Living 
constitutionalists usually have political views that are easy to 
discern from the results to which their mode of interpretation 
leads them. And that makes sense because a political agenda 
provides a powerful reason to reject originalism and to disrespect 
settled precedents. What makes this book very odd is the 
absence—apart from a vague distrust of popular government and 
a touching faith in federal judges—of any obvious political or 
ideological agenda. In a certain way, this is a refreshingly 
academic quality. If the book’s arguments were stronger than they 
are, it would also be an admirably academic quality. But it is very 
hard to see why one would make patently untentable arguments 
in support of recommendations that would have only marginal 
effects if they were adopted. This book thus seems entirely 
unsuccesful either as an academic exercise or as legal advocacy. 
 
 
 65. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s 
Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255 (2010). 
